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Abstract
The adoption of agriculture, some 10,000 years ago, triggered the rst
demographic explosion in human history. When fertility fell back to its
original level, early farmers found themselves worse fed than the previous
hunter-gatherers, and worked longer hours to make ends meet. I develop a
dynamic, price-theoretic model with endogenous fertility that rationalises
these events. The results are driven by the reduction in the cost of children
that followed the adoption of agriculture.
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1 Introduction
The shift from hunting and gathering to agriculture, or the Neolithic Revolution
(10,000 to 5,000 B.P.), was followed by a sharp increase in fertility (Bocquet-
Appel, 2002). In the course of a few centuries, typical communities grew from
about 30 individuals to 300 or more, and population densities increased from
less than one hunter-gatherer per square mile to 20 or more farmers (Johnson
and Earle, 2000, pp. 43, 125, 246).
This demographic explosion has been attributed to two causes. First, food
was available to early farmers in unprecedented quantities (Price and Gebauer,
1995). Second, children were much cheaper for early farmers than they were for
hunter-gatherers, since caring for children interfered with hunting and gathering,
but not with farming. More important, children of farmers could contribute to
food production (Kramer and Boone 2002).
Although early farmers produced food in larger quantities, their nutrition
was poorer than that of hunter-gatherers (Armelagos et al., 1991; Cohen and
Armelagos, 1984). All the extra food was used by the farmers to support...
more farmers. To make matters worse, working time increased after agriculture
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was adopted. Ethnographical studies indicate that hunter-gatherers worked less
that six hours per day, whereas primitive horticulturists worked seven hours on
average, and intensive agriculturalists worked nine (Sackett, 1996, pp. 33842).
I develop a dynamic, price-theoretic model with endogenous fertility that
makes sense of these perplexing events, provided some plausible conditions hold.
In my model, a tribe of hunter-gatherers discovers agriculture and adopts it
because doing so increases the return to labour and the productivity of children.
As a result, fertility rises above the replacement rate, and population begins
to grow. The return to labor, which is negatively related to population size,
progressively falls. In the long-run, the return to labor settles below its original
level. When the population restabilises, later generations of farmers are poorer,
consume less food, and work longer hours than hunter-gatherers. Yet the later
generations choose to remain farmers because, at their numbers, reverting to
hunting and gathering would make them even worse o¤.
The increase in the productivity of children, which amounts to a fall in
their price, drives the results of the model. Enhancements in food production
technology have only one e¤ect in the long-run: population growth.
To the best of my knowledge, my model of agriculture adoption is the rst
to include three goods in the tribesmans utility function: food consumption,
leisure, and fertility. This allows me to evaluate the welfare e¤ects of the adop-
tion of agriculture, both in the short-run and in the long-run. The model as-
sumes the tribesman freely chooses a bundle of the three goods, given his total
income and the prices he faces. The return to labour varies endogenously with
the size of the population. In the long-run, population adjusts so that the return
to labour converges to the value at which the tribesmans optimal decision is
to reproduce at the replacement rate. In sum, the model combines two notions
of equilibrium: a market equilibrium that holds at all times, and a Malthusian
equilibrium that guarantees population will be stable in the long-run.
2 Related literature
Theories of the adoption of agriculture have been extensively surveyed by Weis-
dorf (2005). I will thus limit this review to previous explanations for the loss of
welfare that followed the adoption.
According to Weisdorf (2004), early farmers gave away leisure in exchange
for goods produced by an emerging class of specialists (e.g., craftsmen and
bureaucrats). Marceau and Myers (2006) model the fall in consumption and
leisure as a tragedy of the commons. Both Weisdorf and Marceau and Myers
assume population remains constant during the transition to agriculture.
Two papers, one by Weisdorf (2008) and the other by Robson (2008), address
the demographic dimension of the transition.
Weisdorf incorporates Malthusian population principles into a model with
two sectors: hunting and agriculture. In his model, the higher productivity of
agriculture motivates its adoption, but the subsequent population growth swal-
lows the benets. Weisdorf assumes peoples only desire in life is to reproduce,
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and that they will work as many hours as it takes to maximise their fertility.
He also assumes food consumption is an increasing function of the energy spent
at work, but does not incorporate food into the utility function.
Robson develops a model with two goods: children and their health. In
Robsons model, infectious diseases become more prevalent as population in-
creases. This makes the health of children more expensive for farmers than for
the (less populous) hunter-gatherers. Farmers respond by having more children
and investing less in their health than their predecessors.
3 A model of agriculture adoption
3.1 Model setup
A tribe has N > 0 identical adult members or tribesmen. A tribesman chooses
food consumption c > 0, leisure r > 0, and the number of his children n > 0
in order to maximise utility function u(c; r; n), which is increasing in all its
arguments.1 The tribesman is subject to the following budget constraint:
w  (T   r + n)  c+ n
Variable w > 0 is the return to labour in units of food, T > 0 is the tribesmans
disposable time, and T  r > 0 is his labour supply. Parameter   0 represents
child productivity measured in man-hours. The children of hunter-gatherers
dont contribute to production, so  = 0. When agriculture is adopted,  rises
to a positive amount. Parameter  > 0 measures the food requirements of a
child.
The budget constraint can be rewritten as follows:
I  c+ prr + pnn; (1)
where I = wT is total income, pr = w is the price of leisure, and pn =  w > 0
is the price of children.
The return to labour w is a function of a technology parameter A and of
population N . As usual, w is increasing in A. Following Malthus, I assume w
falls with N . Using subscripts to denote partial derivatives, these assumptions
translate into wA > 0 and wN < 0.
Population dynamics is governed by the following equation:
N 0 = nN;
where N 0 is next periods adult population.
In the short-run, population N is xed and fertility n responds to income
and prices. In the long-run, N adjusts so that the return to labour w converges
to the value at which the tribesmans optimal decision is to bear children at
1There is ample evidence that pre-modern peoples deliberately chose the number of their
children. The methods they used included abstinence, celibacy, prolonged breast-feeding,
abortion, and infanticide (see Douglas, 1966, and Cashdan, 1985).
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the replacement rate: n = 1. These assumptions link the model to the family
of endogenous fertility models in which decreasing returns to labour act as a
Malthusian population check. These models were pioneered by Razin and Ben-
Zion (1975). Other examples are Boldrin and Jones (2002), Eckstein et al.
(1988), and Nerlove et al. (1986).
Without loss of generality, let the tribesmans choices be summarised by the
Marshallian demands that stem from his utility function:
c = cm (pr; pn; I);
r = rm (pr; pn; I);
n = nm(pr; pn; I):
3.2 E¤ects of the adoption of agriculture
I model the adoption of agriculture as two technological changes: an increase
in child productivity  and an enhancement in food production technology A.
Here, I explore the e¤ects of both changes.
The e¤ects of an increase in child productivity
Let A be constant. Totally di¤erentiating w and the Marshallian demands with
respect to , we obtain a linear system for the e¤ects of an increase in child
productivity:
w = wNN; (2)
c = c
m
pr w + c
m
pn  ( w   w) + cmI wT; (3)
r = r
m
pr w + r
m
pn  ( w   w) + rmI wT; (4)
n = n
m
pr w|{z}
dpr
d
+ nmpn  ( w   w)| {z }
dpn
d
+ nmI wT|{z}
dI
d
; (5)
where w, c, r, n, and N are the unknown total derivatives. The system is
closed with Nsr = 0 for the short-run, and with n
lr
 = 0 for the long-run, where
superscripts sr and lr distinguish short-run and long-run solutions.
We now search for conditions that su¢ ce to reproduce the stylised facts of
the Neolithic revolution: a short-run fertility rise (nsr > 0), a long-run increase
in population (Nlr > 0), and long-run falls in food consumption and leisure
(clr < 0 and r
lr
 < 0).
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Initially, the tribesman hunts and gathers, so  = 0. Replacing  = 0 in
equations (3)(5), we get:
c = (c
m
pr + c
m
I T )w   wcmpn ; (6)
r = (r
m
pr + r
m
I T )w   wrmpn ; (7)
n = (n
m
pr + n
m
I T )w   wnmpn . (8)
From equations (2) and (8), plus condition Nsr = 0 we obtain:
wsr = 0;
nsr =  wnmpn : (9)
The return to labour w remains constant in the short-run (wsr = 0), because in
the short-run population is xed. Equation (9) tells us that fertility n will in-
crease in the short-run if  increases and the demand for children has a negative
slope: nmpn < 0.
Should the tribesman adopt agriculture? Yes, and this is why. The return
to labour remains constant in the short-run, and that implies total income and
the price of leisure remain constant as well:
dI
d
sr = Twsr = 0;
dpr
d
sr = wsr = 0:
But adopting agriculture increases , which brings the price of children down:
dpn
d
sr =  w < 0;
The fall in pn, while I and pr stay unchanged, pushes the tribesmans budget
constraint outwards, unambiguously increasing his utility.
From equations (2) and (6)(8), plus condition nlr = 0 we get the long-run
comparative statics:
wlr =
wnmpn
nmpr + n
m
I T
;
clr =
cmpr + c
m
I T
nmpr + n
m
I T
wnmpn   wcmpn ; (10)
rlr =
rmpr + r
m
I T
nmpr + n
m
I T
wnmpn   wrmpn ; (11)
Nlr =
wnmpn
wN  (nmpr + nmI T )
(12)
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Equations (9)(12) yield a set of su¢ cient conditions for fertility to rise in
the short-run, population to increase in the long-run, and food consumption
and leisure to fall in the long-run:
1. The return to labour is decreasing in population: wN < 0.
2. The Marshallian demand for children has a negative slope: nmpn < 0:
3. The demand for children is increasing in the return to labour: nw =
nmpr +Tn
m
I > 0. This condition can be interpreted in terms of child labour
supply: the supply of child labour increases when the return to their labour
increases.
4. Consumption is a normal good, and a gross substitute of leisure and chil-
dren: cmI ; c
m
pr ; c
m
pn > 0.
5. Leisure is a gross substitute of children: rmpn > 0.
6. Leisure is decreasing in the return to labour: rw = rmpr + r
m
I T < 0.
7. Leisure is more responsive to changes in the return to labour than to
changes in the price of children: jrmpr + rmI T j > rmpn .
8. Fertility is more responsive to changes in the price of children than to
changes in the return to labour: nmpr + n
m
I T < jnmpn j.
Later generations of farmers dont revert to hunting and gathering because
that would increase the price of children, while total income and the price of
leisure remain constant. The farmerswelfare would thus fall in the short-run.
At their numbers, hunting and gathering is no longer an option... The farmers
are trapped in a nasty equilibrium with lots of people, low incomes, scanty food,
and too much work.
What lies behind these puzzling results?
An increase in the productivity of children promotes a present and future
rise in fertility, because more productive children are cheaper:
dpn
d
sr = dpnd
lr =  w < 0:
But equilibrium requires later generations to reproduce at the replacement rate
(n = 1). Since children will remain cheap in the long-run, the return to labour
must fall below its original level (wlr < 0) to induce future generations to
limit their fertility to one child per capita. The fall in the return to labour
is achieved through the increase in population (Nlr > 0) that results from a
temporary increase in fertility (nsr > 0).
In addition, the long-run reduction in the return to labour implies the price
of leisure will fall:
dpr
d
lr = wlr < 0:
6
Because food is a normal good and a gross substitute of leisure and children, the
long-run reductions in I, pr and in pn will all push food consumption downwards
(clr < 0).
Two opposing forces act upon leisure in the long-run. On the one hand,
leisure will be cheaper, so the tribesmen will tend to rest more and work less.
On the other hand, total income will be lower and children will be cheaper:
since leisure is a normal good and a gross substitute of children, the tribesmen
will want to reduce leisure and increase working hours. Conditions 7 and 8
guarantee the second e¤ect will dominate the rst, so leisure decreases in the
long-run (rlr < 0).
The e¤ects of enhancements in food production technology
Let  be constant. Totally di¤erentiating w and the Marshallian demands with
respect to A, we obtain a linear system for the e¤ects of enhancements in the
food production technology:
wA = wA + wNNA;
cA = c
m
pr wA + c
m
pn  ( wA) + cmI wAT;
rA = r
m
pr wA + r
m
pn  ( wA) + rmI wAT;
nA = n
m
pr wA|{z}
dpr
dA
+ nmpn  ( wA)| {z }
dpn
dA
+ nmI wAT| {z }
dI
dA
;
where wA, cA, rA, nA, and NA are the unknown total derivatives. The system
is closed with NsrA = 0 for the short-run, and with n
lr
A = 0 for the long-run.
Using  = 0, the system boils down to:
wA = wA + wNNA;
cA = c
m
pr wA + c
m
I wAT;
rA = r
m
pr wA + r
m
I wAT;
nA = n
m
prwA + n
m
I wAT
Under the conditions stated in the previous section, we obtain:
wsrA = wA > 0;
nsrA = n
m
prwA + n
m
I wAT > 0;
wlrA = c
lr
A = r
lr
A = n
lr
A = 0;
NlrA =  
wA
wN
> 0:
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It follows that the return to labour rises in the short-run and so does fertility,
and that the only long-run e¤ect of a larger A is an increase in population.
Consumption and leisure dont change in the long-run because neither total
income nor prices change:
dI
dA
lr = TwlrA = 0
dpr
dA
lr = wlrA = 0
dpn
dA
lr = 0
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